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Abstract : Funding contingent upon evidence development (FED) has recently
been the subject of some considerable debate in the literature but relatively
little has been made of its economic impact. We argue that FED has the
potential to shorten the lag between innovation and access but may also
(i) crowd-out more valuable interventions in situations in which there is a ﬁxed
dedicated budget; or (ii) lead to a de facto increase in the funding threshold and
increased expenditure growth in situations in which the programme budget is
open-ended. Although FED would typically entail periodic review of provisional
or interim listings, it may prove difﬁcult to withdraw funding even at
cost/QALY ratios well in excess of current listing thresholds. Further
consideration of the design and implementation of FED processes is therefore
required to ensure that its introduction yields net beneﬁts over existing processes.
1. Introduction
Funding contingent upon evidence development (FED) has recently been the
subject of some considerable debate in the literature (Carino et al., 2006; Tunis
and Pearson, 2006; Lindsay et al., 2007; Tunis and Chalkidou, 2007; Miller
and Pearson, 2008). FED has been characterized as a pathway to ‘provisional’
funding for promising new drugs or devices that are likely to face difﬁculties in
meeting the usual standard of proof for funding approval (Tunis and Pearson,
2006; Tunis and Chalkidou, 2007; Miller and Pearson, 2008). For interventions
that fall short of the usual standard of proof with regard to safety, effectiveness
or cost-effectiveness, further phase II/III data may be required to permit funding
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agencies to make an informed decision regarding permanent listing. FED for
drugs/devices that lack adequate phase II/III evidence and therefore fall short of
the usual standard of proof for funding approval is denoted in the discussion
that follows as FED-L (Funding contingent upon Evidence Development - Low).
According to a decision-making framework proposed by Chalkidou et al. (2008),
FED-L may be appropriate where (i) expected net beneﬁts are positive but
uncertain; (ii) the value of information exceeds the cost of evidence development;
and (iii) the net costs of delaying listing (saying ‘no’ to applications for listing until
sufﬁcient evidence is available to meet the usual standard of proof) exceed the net
costs of bringing forward (potentially limited) access to an intervention that may
prove to be inferior to current practice.
Others have argued that the phase III data that usually support ‘yes’/‘no’ listing
decisions do not always permit decision-makers to clearly identify an intervention
as either cost-effective or cost-ineffective. There might, for example, remain
considerable uncertainty as to whether the treatment effects identiﬁed in phase III
trials can be replicated in routine practice (Hutton et al., 2007). Permitting
provisional funding under FED based on phase III data would then allow ‘yes’
decisions to be replaced with ‘maybe’ contingent upon the collection of post-
marketing surveillance data as to effectiveness in routine practice. In this case, a
higher standard of proof (phase III data plus FED data) would presumably be
required to move from provisional funding to permanent listing than is currently
required for ‘yes’ listing decisions (phase III data only). We denote this second
type of conditional funding as FED-H (Funding contingent upon Evidence
Development - High). Applying the Chalkidou et al.’s (2008) framework once
again, interventions eligible for FED-H listing and that are able to meet existing
standards of proof for ‘yes’ listing decisions should have no trouble demonstrating
expected beneﬁts in excess of expected costs. Nonetheless, there will be little point
in replacing a ‘yes’ with a ‘maybe’ contingent upon evidence development unless
the value of this evidence exceeds the cost of development. Funding agencies
should further consider whether the net costs of replacing a ‘yes’ with a ‘maybe’
exceed the net costs of opting for the immediate and unconditional listing of an
intervention that may turn out to be inferior to current practice.
In the United States, both FED-L and FED-H mechanisms are now available to
the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) when making national
coverage determinations (NCDs). The CMS may authorize coverage to patients
enrolled in a clinical trial where ‘evidence is not adequate to support coverage and
where additional data gathered in the context of a clinical trial would further
clarify the impact of these items and services on the health of Medicare bene-
ﬁciaries’ (CMS, 2006: 4). This coverage with study participation (CSP) authority
is available to interventions that would previously have fallen short of the
usual ‘reasonable and necessary’ standard for unconditional coverage under
Medicare. The CMS may also authorize coverage with appropriateness determi-
nation (CAD) in situations in which ‘‘there is adequate evidence to determine that
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an item or service is reasonable and necessaryy but that additional clinical data
is neededy to ensure that the item or service is being provided to appropriate
patients in the manner described in the NCD’’ (CMS, 2006: 3). CMS use of CAD
and CSP authority has been described in detail elsewhere (Carino et al., 2006;
Tunis and Pearson, 2006; Lindsay et al., 2007).
In Australia, the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) may
recommend interim funding through temporary listing on the Medical Beneﬁts
Schedule (MBS) ‘‘to enable data collection to be undertaken on new and pro-
mising interventions for which conclusive evidence on safety, effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness is lacking’’ (MSAC, 2005a: 49). Recommendations for
temporary listing require various primary and secondary criteria to be met,
including: clinical need, ‘some’ evidence of effectiveness, ‘adequate’ evidence of
safety, a likelihood of cost-effectiveness and the potential for further studies to
reduce uncertainty. ‘‘The objective of the interim funding arrangements is to
raise the level of evidence above the existing level for the interventions under
review’’ (MSAC, 2005a: 52); for example, to obtain level II evidence where only
level III evidence was previously available, or to obtain level III-2 evidence
where only level IV evidence was previously available. For example, in MSAC
Assessment 1031 – Deep brain stimulation for the symptoms of Parkinson’s
disease, interim funding was recommended ‘‘subject to patients’ participation in
an appropriate controlled trial to obtain information on adverse events, longer-
term patient outcomes and costs in the Australian setting’’ (MSAC, 2001a: 37).
For Assessment 1014 – Transurethral needle ablation for benign prostatic
hyperplasia, interim funding was ‘‘linked to the acquisition of data on the type
of patients treated and safety data to monitor use under interim arrangements’’
(MSAC, 2002a: ix). For Assessment 1065 – Sentinel lymph node biopsy in
breast cancer, interim funding was provided ‘‘pending the outcome of trials
already in progress’’ (MSAC, 2005b: ix). In other cases, interim funding was
recommended without any speciﬁc reference to trials in progress and without
any requirement to collect additional funding but contingent upon review within
a speciﬁed period (MSAC, 2002b). For MBS items that do not undergo
assessment through MSAC, the standard listing is now time limited (normally
for a period of between three to four years) and contingent upon monitoring/
evaluation [Medicare Beneﬁts Reviews Task Group (MBRTG), 2010]. At the
end of the time-limited period, the relevant MBS advisory committee may
recommend: discontinuation of listing, extension of the time-limited listing,
amendment before conversion to ongoing listing or conversion to ongoing
listing without amendment (MBRTG, 2010).
Also in Australia, the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Advisory Committee (PBAC)
used an FED-L mechanism as early as December 2003. Speciﬁcally, the PBAC
entered into an agreement with the industry sponsor to list bosentan for idio-
pathic pulmonary artery hypertension despite the fact that the sponsor’s claims
regarding cost-effectiveness were reliant on an assumed survival beneﬁt that was
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not then supported by the available evidence (Wlodarczyk et al., 2006). Listing
was contingent upon the collection of registry data and pricing was to be con-
tingent upon observed survival in registry enrolled patients wherein price
reductions would compensate for any departure from the assumed survival
beneﬁt (Owen et al., 2006; Wlodarczyk et al., 2006).
In the United Kingdom, the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) may issue ‘only in research’ (OIR) guidance where the
available evidence for health technologies, public health programmes or clinical
practice is not yet sufﬁciently strong to support a positive or negative recom-
mendation (Chalkidou et al., 2007). Approximately 4% of NICE technology
appraisals published between 1999 and early 2007 recommended use only in the
context of research. NICE use of OIR provisions has been described in detail
elsewhere (Chalkidou et al., 2007).
Despite a recent proliferation of papers discussing issues of implementation and
design (Carino et al., 2006; Tunis and Pearson, 2006; Chalkidou et al., 2007;
Lindsay et al., 2007; Tunis and Chalkidou, 2007; Miller and Pearson, 2008; Briggs
et al., 2010; Dhalla et al., 2010; Menon et al., 2010), relatively little has been
made of the economic impact of permitting provisional funding under FED-type
mechanisms. The present paper characterizes the economic impact of permitting
FED-L or FED-H under (i) a ﬁxed dedicated budget and (ii) an open-ended budget
with one or more exogenously determined funding threshold(s).
2. Breaking up is hard to do
Much of the argument that follows relies on the premise that breaking up is
hard to do. Or, put another way, on the ‘‘general consensus that it is politically
more difﬁcult for decision-makers to withdraw coverage – even if formally
temporary – than to refuse coverage in the ﬁrst place’’ (Hutton et al., 2007:
427). For the most part, explicit delisting of drugs/devices from formularies has
previously been carefully avoided by bodies with direct control of coverage such
as the PBAC and MSAC; perhaps because of the anticipated political resistance.
Instead such bodies have adopted a largely passive role and have relied upon
clinicians to modify their prescribing practice to replace inferior interventions
with more effective or better-tolerated alternatives as and when they become
available. This passive approach has the potential to achieve a sharp curtailment
of use where interventions are revealed to have a poor risk/beneﬁt trade-off and
where physicians face strong ﬁnancial incentives and clear ethical imperatives to
‘do no harm’ (Tunis and Chalkidou, 2007). Where the required change in pre-
scribing practice entails reversion to an older and possibly less-effective (but
more cost-effective) intervention, the passive approach is unlikely to curtail the
natural diffusion of an FED-listed technology.
Hutton et al. argue that ‘‘where coverage with evidence development is
managed by a body with direct control of coveragey the removal of coverage
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is usually a sufﬁcient incentive mechanism to contain any further use’’ (2007:
430). While we agree that control of coverage provides an obvious mechanism
for curtailing use and diffusion, additional enforcement action may sometimes
be required to obtain the required change in practice. Even where funding
agencies are successful in delisting FED drugs or devices for a speciﬁc indication,
there may be considerable inertia in practice if the FED drug/device or procedure
remains listed for closely related indications or by other funding agencies. For
example, lung volume reduction surgery (LVRS) for advanced emphysema was
included in the Australian MBS under services that do not attract Medicare
beneﬁts; reﬂecting February 2001 recommendation of the MSAC that public
funding should not be supported (MSAC, 2001b). Previously, Medicare beneﬁts
for LVRS were claimed under item numbers 38,456 (intrathoracic operation),
38,424 (thoracotomy) and 38,440 (wedge resection of the lung) (MSAC,
2001b). In addition to withdrawal of coverage, MSAC also recommended that
surgeons should obtain approval from their hospital’s ethics committee before
performing LVRS, that patients should be informed of the risks of LVRS and
that Australian state and federal health ministers should be informed of the
decision to discontinue public funding (MSAC, 2001b). In effect, MSAC
recognized that withdrawal of MBS coverage might not be sufﬁcient to curtail
utilization (even for an intervention with a poor risk/beneﬁt trade-off) and
therefore took steps to directly inﬂuence hospital policy, patients’ treatment
decisions and decision-making by other fund holders.
Although there is general consensus that ‘breaking up is hard to do’ even
where coverage is explicitly time limited, there are as yet few examples where an
explicit and concerted attempt has been made to delist or restrict coverage of
a FED-listed intervention. In many cases, the decision to award provisional
funding under an FED-type mechanism has yet to be formally reviewed. For
example, the UK Multiple Sclerosis Risk Sharing Scheme (MSRSS) – a colla-
borative agreement under which manufacturers supplied their drugs at a dis-
counted price – and the UK Department of Health approved provisional funding
for multiple sclerosis (MS) drugs under an FED-type mechanism. In this case, it
is simply not possible to evaluate the difﬁculty (or otherwise) of withdrawing
provisional funding based on FED data because the MSRSS Monitoring Study
‘‘has yet to publish any analysis of the data and there has been no price review,
some seven years after it was established’’ (McCabe et al., 2010).
Where review has been undertaken, very often the recommendations of the
review are yet to be released into the public domain such that it is not possible to
observe whether an attempt to restrict or withdraw coverage has been made. In
a recent review describing the operation of FED schemes, Staﬁnski et al. (2010)
were unable to access information regarding interim or ﬁnal listing decisions based
on FED data for 25 of 26 ‘pay for performance’ or ‘outcomes guarantee’ schemes.
Staﬁnski et al. (2010) were also unable to access information regarding interim
or ﬁnal listing decisions based on FED data for 15 of the 32 ‘funding with
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study participation’ schemes; although in many cases this was because FED data
collection was ongoing at the time of their review. In such situations, provisional
funding is often simply extended until adequate supplementary data are available
to support a formal review; suggesting that an absence of further evidence may be
enough to avoid delisting or restriction. In the context of ‘yes’/‘no’ decisions for
permanent listing, Chalkidou et al. noted that ‘‘with reimbursement secured,
sponsors of the technology may be less inclined to fund research that could narrow
the indications for their technology’’ (2008: 1643). Depending upon the extent of
any restrictions on patient access during the FED period, a similar incentive may
operate to delay evidence development if the default position is simply to extend
funding until the data become available. Note, for example, that ‘‘CMS continues
to provide coverage for implantable cardiac deﬁbrillators as part of a registry
study’’ despite the fact that the evidence compiled by ‘‘the registry was deemed
unable to answer CMS questions’’ (Staﬁnski et al., 2010: 126 and 128).
For several of the ‘funding with study participation’ schemes in which infor-
mation on funding decisions and ﬁndings from FED data were both available,
Staﬁnski et al. (2010) characterized interim or ﬁnal decisions to extend or
conﬁrm funding as being inconsistent with FED data. In the case of LVRS for
emphysema, the CMS extended coverage for many non-high-risk patients. This
was despite the fact that the FED data suggested that the technology had ‘sig-
niﬁcant risks and limited beneﬁts’ (Chalkidou et al., 2008); even in the subgroup
of non-high-risk patients who were most likely to obtain a survival beneﬁt from
LVRS (Carino et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2007).
3. Endowment effects and gain/loss asymmetry
Why then should withdrawal of coverage (or ‘breaking up’) be any more difﬁ-
cult than refusal of coverage in the ﬁrst place, even where coverage is explicitly
time limited and contingent on the development of evidence? Breaking up might
be particularly hard to do if individuals must be paid more in compensation
for the loss of an entitlement or ownership than they would willingly pay to gain
the same entitlement or ownership. The available evidence suggests that this
type of ‘gain/loss asymmetry’ may be a pervasive characteristic of preferences
(Knetsch and Wong, 2009), with ratios of willingness to accept (WTA) to
willingness to pay (WTP) well in excess of unity for both private goods such as
mugs, chocolate or hockey tickets and public goods such as environmental
amenity or public infrastructure (Bischoff, 2008). In the health sector, gain/loss
asymmetry would most obviously arise in patients’ valuations of health gains/
losses (and, because health care is instrumental to health gains/losses, in the
value that patients place on access to health-care interventions). Gain/loss
asymmetry may also arise in the value that clinicians and industry/shareholders
place on proﬁts/losses associated with delivery of health care and the sale of
drugs and devices.
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The phenomenon of gain/loss asymmetry has been attributed to an ‘endow-
ment effect’ wherein ‘‘individuals asked for their WTA for a certain good will
consider this good part of their endowment while individuals asked for their
WTP do not’’ (Bischoff, 2008: 284). Gain/loss asymmetry would then arise if
individuals’ valuations of a good or service depend upon whether or not they
have an entitlement to, or ownership of, that good or service either because
of general loss aversion or disutility associated with the mere act of parting
(Bischoff, 2008). Contrary to this view, it has been suggested that gain/loss
asymmetry arises not as a consequence of an endowment effect but from
framing biases, learning effects, imprecision and/or strategic thinking (see
Smith et al., 1999 for a review). For example, an upward bias in WTAvaluations
might arise as a consequence of respondents’ relative lack of familiarity with
expressing WTA (O’Brien and Gafni, 1996), or because WTA is not constrained
by ability to pay (Gafni and Ravid, 1989; Whynes and Sach, 2007). Where
gain/loss asymmetry arises due to one or more of these alternative explanations,
an argument can be made for disregarding empirical evidence of a divergence
and ignoring what amounts to a bias or framing effect. In this context, it is
worth noting that there is evidence for the persistence of gain/loss asymmetry
even after controlling for many such alternative explanations including learning
effects (Morrison, 1998, 2000), strategic thinking (Kahneman et al., 1990),
substitution effects (Morrison, 1998), imprecision (Dubourg et al., 1994;
Morrison, 1998) and incentives induced by experimental design (Knetsch and
Wong, 2009).
A recent review of the literature concluded that the magnitude of gain/loss
asymmetry can be substantial, with WTA/WTP ratios ranging from 1.9 to 6.4
for health studies (n52), 1.1 to 3.6 for safety studies (n54) and up to 89.4 in
one environmental study (O’Brien et al., 2002). Whynes and Sach (2007)
reported a WTA/WTP ratio of 4.0 (£497.80/£124.10) for paediatric cochlear
implant in the one-third of respondents who provided both WTA and WTP
valuations. Grutters et al. (2008) conﬁrmed a quantitatively important diver-
gence between WTA and WTP valuations in the context of a discrete choice
experiment. WTA/WTP ratios from the study by Grutters et al. (2008) ranged
from 1.7 to 3.2 when WTA and WTP were calculated for several different
modes of hearing aid provision (deﬁned by provider/accuracy of assessment,
follow-up, duration of treatment and payment/discount).
For interventions that are more effective than their comparators, gain/loss
asymmetry would equate to a higher threshold for delisting than for listing. With
a listing threshold of between 42,000 and 76,000 AUD/QALY in 1989–1990
values (George et al., 2001) and a WTA/WTP ratio of 2.0, the delisting threshold
for an intervention in the north-east quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane
would be between 84,000 and 152,000 AUD/QALY. In a recent review of the
Australian cost-effectiveness literature, 218 of the 245 interventions (89%)
included in the review had a reported incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)
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below $152,000/LY or QALYor DALY in June 2005 values (Dalziel et al., 2008).
For a WTA/WTP ratio of 4.0, the delisting threshold would increase to between
168,000 and 304,000 AUD/QALY.
Even higher delisting thresholds than those postulated above may arise in the
event that WTA/WTP ratios are found, for example, to be systematically higher
in the case of life-threatening conditions for which there is no alternative
treatment. As yet, too few studies have been conducted to provide empirical
evidence for systematic variation in WTA/WTP ratios by disease or severity
(Whynes and Sach, 2007). Empirical evidence from revealed and stated-preference
studies does, however, suggest that WTP for a unit of health gain varies with
characteristics of the intervention or patient population (e.g. Mortimer and
Segal, 2008; Segal et al., 2010). NICE Appraisals Committees have – when
certain speciﬁed conditions are met – recently been granted license to recom-
mend life-extending medicines for terminal illnesses affecting small numbers
of patients; even in situations in which such medicines deliver incremental
cost/QALY ratios well in excess of the standard £30,000 listing threshold
(NICE, 2005, 2010). A higher listing threshold for life-extending medicines
for terminal illnesses would then imply a higher delisting threshold for this type
of intervention such that delisting might remain difﬁcult even at incremental
cost-effectiveness ratios in excess of $500,000/QALY.
4. An impolitic policy?
O’Brien et al. (2002) argued from a welfarist perspective that any gain/loss
asymmetry evident in patient and provider preferences should be reﬂected in
funding thresholds for coverage decisions. Dowie (2004, 2005), on the other
hand, argues that ‘‘within an extra-welfarist framework, decision-makers
committed to cost-effectiveness as the ethical basis for resource allocation in
public health care can remain coherent only by ignoring irrelevant private
preferences such as those embodied in a kinked ICER’’ (Dowie, 2005: 1204). We
suggest here that remaining coherent and ignoring private preferences may be
easier said than done when faced with political pressure for the protection of
existing entitlements (ampliﬁed in comparison to appeals for access to new
drugs/devices due to gain/loss asymmetry). Put another way, political pressure is
suggested as a possible mechanism through which gain/loss asymmetry acts to
make delisting much more difﬁcult than denying listing.
Booth et al. (2007) suggest that there are interdependent relationships
between media, politics, industry and patient interest groups, which together
may inﬂuence funding decisions. Ferner and McDowell (2006) observe that
patient interest groups often share a common interest with industry in pro-
moting/protecting access to drugs/devices through public coverage. With
industry funding of patient lobby groups being the rule rather than the exception
(Marshall and Aldhous, 2006; Mintzes, 2007), patient interest groups provide
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an arms-length vehicle for companies to inﬂuence public perception of their
drugs (Herxheimer, 2003). Patient interest groups along such lines have exer-
cised both direct (through, for example, representations to funding committees)
and indirect (through, for example, the press or political representatives) pres-
sure to promote the shared interests of their members and of industry. In the
context of FED-listed interventions, such tactics proved effective in pressuring
the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care to end FED requirements
for positron emission tomography (PET) several years before the forecast
completion of evidence development (Staﬁnski et al., 2010).
The role of political pressure will likely vary depending on the characteristics of
the disease (e.g. prevalence, severity), patients (e.g. age group, education) and
intervention (e.g. availability of substitutes, expected cost and effectiveness).
Certainly patients may be more motivated to exert political pressure to secure or
maintain coverage of last-line treatment for life-threatening illnesses than for
preventative or ‘me-too’ interventions (MacKenzie et al., 2008). All else equal, the
role of political pressure will also depend upon the extent to which the relevant
technology has diffused across eligible patients and providers. Where FED status
limits diffusion of a technology, the size of the eligible population with a perceived
entitlement will be similarly limited. Limitations on access may also have the
effect of restricting the number of providers afforded an opportunity to become
familiar with the new technology and with a perceived entitlement to revenues
or cost savings arising from application of that technology. FED with access
limitations can therefore be expected to limit political pressure simply because
fewer patients and providers experience the endowment effect. While access under
FED will typically imply limited access in comparison with permanent listing
(and, all else equal, weaker political resistance to attempts to restrict or withdraw
coverage), political pressure should be weaker still if access can be withheld until
sufﬁcient evidence is available to support permanent listing.
Conversely, attempts to restrict access or withdraw coverage of rapidly
diffusing technologies will likely be met with a more widespread resistance if they
have already achieved widespread use. In late 2007, the CMS and Congress
proposed ‘sharp limits on coverage’ for computed tomographic (CT) angiography,
then a new and rapidly diffusing technology that had hitherto avoided restriction
under the NCD process (Appleby, 2008). In the absence of an NCD, ‘rapid
adoption’ had occurred supported by local coverage. This relatively unrestricted
local coverage had created a ‘‘ﬁnancial incentive to order and perform all manner
of CT scans’’ and had strengthened the impetus for ‘‘an increasing number of
physicians own or lease their own CT machines’’ (Appleby, 2008: 2). In an
attempt ‘‘yto address the overall growth in CT angiography despite a paucity
of evidence’’ (Appleby, 2008: 4), the CMS proposed limitations on access
that would have restricted coverage by both indication and study participation
status. However, faced with a concerted and coordinated campaign against their
proposal, the CMS decided not to pursue a NCD; effectively preserving the
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status quo of unrestricted coverage through local medicare contractors (CMS,
2008). Although it is not possible in this case to examine the counter factual of
CMS limitations on access and coverage prior to widespread diffusion across
medicare providers, many private sector fund holders who restricted coverage
relatively early in the piece (e.g. AETNA, 2007) have maintained restrictions
despite continued lobbying by industry and professional associations [e.g. Society
of Cardiovascular Computer Tomography (SCCT), 2010].
We have argued above that political pressure is one mechanism through which
gain/loss asymmetry acts to make delisting much more difﬁcult than denying
listing in the ﬁrst place and which – all else equal – renders disinvestment of fully
diffused technologies more difﬁcult than disinvestment of provisionally funded
interventions that are subject to ‘OIR’-type restrictions. It should, however, be
emphasized that several other of the now well-known barriers to disinvestment
(Elshaug et al., 2007) also vary by reimbursement status and/or the ‘complete-
ness’ of technology diffusion. For example, there may be considerable inertia in
clinical practice; particularly for interventions with a long-standing place in
both formularies and clinical practice. For patients with chronic illness who
have already commenced treatment, physicians facing an ethical imperative to
‘do no harm’ may ﬁnd themselves faced with the unpalatable prospect of having
to discontinue or modify an apparently effective and well-tolerated treatment
regimen (Tunis and Chalkidou, 2007). For new patients not yet commenced on
treatment, clinicians may be resistant to modifying their practice if they have
incurred sunk costs in self-education and become familiar with the risks and
beneﬁts of the FED-listed intervention.
Many of these additional barriers to disinvestment may be more amenable to
modiﬁcation than is the political pressure arising from gain/loss asymmetry. For
example, it may be possible to improve the quality and completeness of the
evidence-based supporting disinvestment by modifying incentives or increasing
funding. Although the analysis that follows does not in any way rely on barriers
to disinvestment beyond the ampliﬁed political resistance arising from gain/loss
asymmetry, the continued operation of one or more additional barriers to dis-
investment (due, for example, to a failure of evidence development or approval
of provisional funding without specifying processes for review) can be expected
to further complicate attempts to withdraw or restrict provisionally listed
interventions at the end of the FED period.
5. Economic impact of FED
Given the existence of asymmetry in the value of health gains/losses, the difﬁ-
culties in withdrawing coverage, and the political economy of coverage deci-
sions, what then is the likely economic impact of permitting provisional funding
under FED? In the analysis that follows, we characterize the economic impact of
FED-L or FED-H under (i) a ﬁxed dedicated budget and (ii) an open-ended
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budget with one or more exogenously determined funding threshold(s). Recall
that FED-L entails the collection of phase II/III data during the evidence
development period for interventions that fall short of the usual phase II/III data
requirements for ‘yes’/‘no’ listing decisions. In contrast, FED-H requires inter-
ventions to meet the usual phase II/III data requirements before provisional
funding and to then clear an additional hurdle before permanent listing (based
on post-marketing surveillance or registry data collected during the evidence
development period). To facilitate clear exposition, we deﬁne l as the threshold
for permanent listing under current provisions; g as the threshold for post-FED
delisting; Yt is the set of interventions able to demonstrate ICER,l at time t
based on phase II/III data; Mt is the set of ‘promising’ but unproven interven-
tions without phase II/III data supporting ICER,l at time t; and Kt is the
subset of Mt with ICER,l based on FED data at the end of the evidence
development period.
5.1 Economic impact of FED-L
For FED-L, a higher proportion of interventions will meet the criteria for per-
manent listing and/or provisional funding under FED-L than would meet the
criteria for permanent listing under current provisions. This follows directly from
the deﬁnition of FED-L as provisional FED for drugs/devices that fall short of the
usual standard of proof for funding approval. The set of interventions eligible for
permanent listing and/or provisional funding under FED-L: M01Y0, includes all
interventions that would meet the usual standard of proof for permanent listing,
that is, Y0, plus a further set of interventions, that is,M0, that might be considered
‘promising’ but unproven at the current threshold for listing, that is, l.
Consider ﬁrst the economic impact of FED-L with an open-ended budget
constrained only by an implicit or explicit and exogenously determined funding
threshold that approximates the marginal value of health gains. In the absence
of gain/loss asymmetry, the set of permanently listed interventions, that is,
K01Y0, should be the Y0 plus the subset of M0 that are eventually shown to
satisfy ICER,l based on FED data, that is, K0. Access to the K0 is effectively
brought forward, with M02K0 delisted based on FED data, no change in the
funding threshold, and relatively minor impact on expenditure growth (asso-
ciated with accelerated provisional funding for M0 during the FED period).
However, two complications can be expected to multiply the magnitude of this
expenditure growth many times over.
First, the share of interventions seeking accelerated access to provisional
funding through the FED-L pathway, that is, Mt, can be expected to increase
over time; producing a corresponding decrease in the share of interventions
obtaining funding through traditional pathways, that is, Yt. Hutton et al. argue
that ‘‘the level of evidence available on a technology at the time of launch isy,
to a large extent, determined by the regulatory requirements that apply to the
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technology’’ (2007: 425). If, for example, phase IIB trials were sufﬁcient to meet
the standard of proof for provisional funding under FED-L, the incentive for
sponsors to engage in costly and time-consuming phase III trials would pre-
sumably be very much reduced. If the sponsor decides to conduct phase III trials,
there is a risk that the FED-L pathway will subsequently be closed to the inter-
vention (because additional phase III data that could be obtained under FED
provisions will be less valuable once data from the sponsor’s phase III trial become
available). There is also a risk that uncertainty will be sufﬁciently reduced to
warrant an outright ‘no’ at l. This raises the very real possibility that FED-L will
reduce rather than increase the evidentiary basis for funding decisions.
Where sponsors forgo traditional funding pathways and opt instead for
accelerated access to provisional funding under FED-L, expenditure growth
associated with FED funding for Mt can be expected to increase over time. It is
also possible that – in the absence of mechanisms for recovering costs from
manufacturers such as proﬁt sharing during the FED period or the introduction
of ‘early access fees’ – FED-L will shift regulatory compliance costs from
sponsors to tax payers and transfer responsibility for development of phase III
evidence on to public funding agencies. Although it is unlikely that public
funding agencies would accept responsibility for development of phase III data
in the long term, there is currently provision for public funding agencies
in Spain (Catalan Agency for Health Technology Assessment in Spain) and
Australia (MSAC) to cover costs associated with FED data collection (Hutton
et al., 2007). In a recent review describing the operation of FED mechanisms,
Staﬁnski et al. noted that ‘‘access with evidence development schemes in Italy,
the Netherlands and Ontario were entirely payer ﬁnanced’’ (2010: 127). In other
cases, ‘‘the payer provided funding for the technology/service, while the costs of
data collection were covered by other parties’’ (Staﬁnski et al., 2010: 127).
Second, asymmetry in the value of health gains/losses can be expected to raise
the threshold for delisting, that is, g, above the threshold for listing, that is, l.
Increased expenditure growth will then result simply because a signiﬁcant
number of interventions that would previously have received an outright ‘no’ at l
will meet the lower standard of proof for provisional listing through the FED-L
backdoor and might then prove very difﬁcult to delist even at a cost/QALY ratio
well in excess of l (but below g). Taken together, these two complications can be
expected to produce a de facto increase in the ‘yes’/‘no’ funding threshold; with
a larger and larger share of interventions seeking funding through the FED
pathway and achieving permanent listing (or, at least, avoiding delisting)
whenever ICER,g based on FED data.
Next, we consider the economic impact of FED-L on a ﬁxed budget with l
endogenously determined as the shadow price of health outcomes. In this
situation, we argue that interventions funded through FED-L will crowd out
interventions that would have received an outright ‘yes’ under existing funding
pathways. Consider the set of interventions that would previously have received
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an outright ‘no’ at l but that is now eligible for provisional funding under
FED-L. At the conclusion of the FED period and cessation of provisional
funding, some such interventions may be conﬁrmed based on FED data to have
lower cost/QALY ratios (when health losses and gains are weighted equally)
than interventions for other patient populations or other diseases that would
previously have received an outright ‘yes’ at l. Here, allowing more cost-
effective interventions that would previously have received an outright ‘no’ to
displace less cost-effective interventions that would previously have received an
outright ‘yes’ is desirable and – subject to certain caveats – perfectly consistent
with health maximization. There may, however, be many cases in which FED
data conﬁrm that provisionally listed interventions are relatively cost ineffective
(when health losses and gains are weighted equally) such that ICER.l. Unless
these apparently cost-ineffective interventions are delisted at the end of the FED
period, they too will displace interventions that would previously have received
an outright ‘yes’ at l. Note, however, that endowment effects and gain/loss
asymmetry can be expected to amplify the usual political costs associated with
withholding coverage and it may prove very difﬁcult indeed to subsequently
withdraw these cost-ineffective interventions even at cost/QALY ratios well in
excess of l.
While allowing promising but ultimately cost-ineffective interventions in Mt
to displace marginal interventions in Yt necessitates a departure from the health
maximizing solution, the net impact of FED-L on aggregate health may none-
theless be positive if total health gains derived from the Mt exceed total health
gains from displaced interventions in Yt. FED-L may offer a substantial incre-
ment in aggregate health if Mt5Kt and if delay to listing is signiﬁcant under
current provisions. However, FED-L will likely entail a reduction in aggregate
health if, for example, Kt is a null set. More generally, welfare analysis of FED-L
for Mt5Kt would require further information regarding (i) the distribution of
true population ICERs for interventions in Mt, (ii) the relative costs of data
collection and regulatory compliance under FED-L and under current provi-
sions, (iii) the expected value of FED-L data, (iv) the distribution of true
population ICERs for any displaced interventions in Yt, (v) the duration of the
FED-L period and the relative timing of funding decisions under FED-L as
compared with current provisions and (iv) the probability of delisting for
interventions with ICER.l at the conclusion of the FED period.
5.2 Economic impact of FED-H
For FED-H, interventions that would previously have received an outright ‘yes’
at l are now approved instead for provisional funding subject to collection
of FED data. Therefore, by deﬁnition, the same proportion of interventions
(Y0) would meet the criteria for provisional funding under FED-H as meet
the criteria for permanent listing under current provisions (it is just that
Breaking up is hard to do 521
FED-listed interventions would be required to clear an additional hurdle to
achieve permanent listing). Under FED-H, there is no mechanism by which
sponsors can shift the cost of phase III trials onto funding agencies and the lag
between innovation and access remains as for traditional funding pathways.
For an open-ended budget, FED-H may entail additional costs associated
with FED data collection but is unlikely to lead to any signiﬁcant increase
or reallocation of health-care funding. Although FED-H provides a formal
mechanism for periodic review and removal of interventions that are revealed to
be cost-ineffective by FED data, gain/loss asymmetry can be expected to hamper
attempts at delisting even with cost/QALY ratios well in excess of current listing
thresholds. Because each of the interventions approved for provisional funding
under FED-H would have received an outright ‘yes’ under current provisions,
the introduction of FED-H is likely to leave us with much the same formulary
(or, if delisting of some cost-ineffective interventions can be achieved, a slightly
smaller formulary) but with additional data describing the cost-effectiveness of
funded interventions in routine practice.
The impact of FED-H under a ﬁxed budget (with l endogenously determined
as the shadow price of health outcomes) will be almost identical to the impact of
FED-H under an open-ended budget. At the conclusion of provisional funding
under FED-H, some interventions that would previously have received an out-
right ‘yes’ at l may turn out (based on FED data) to have higher cost/QALY
ratios in routine practice than interventions that would previously have received
an outright ‘no’ at l. Here, there may be some scope to allow more cost-effective
interventions that would previously have received an outright ‘no’ to displace
less cost-effective interventions that would previously have received an outright
‘yes’ (but that are now required to clear an additional hurdle under FED-H).
Having said that, the sponsors of interventions revealed to be disappointingly
cost-ineffective by FED data may feel relatively conﬁdent of their product’s place
on the formulary. Decision-makers may face signiﬁcant political resistance to
formal delisting as patient interest groups and industry exploit public opinion
to protect their shared vested interests. Therefore, again, the introduction of
FED-H is likely to leave us with additional data describing cost-effectiveness in
routine practice but is unlikely to substantially alter the composition of the
formulary.
It should be emphasized that the inﬂuence (or otherwise) of FED data in
updating the formulary will be highly dependent on the ease with which political
barriers to delisting or restriction can be negotiated at the end of the FED period.
However, this need not imply that investment in evidence generation under FED
is not worthwhile in situations in which ‘breaking up is hard to do’. Even where
FED data exerts little or no inﬂuence over the composition of the formulary, it
may still have considerable value by informing evidence-based practice and for
fund holders who have opted to delay provisional and permanent listing until
further evidence becomes available (Hutton et al., 2007).
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6. Conclusion
To date, provisional funding under FED has typically been granted to interventions
that fall short of the standard of proof for funding through existing pathways
(Hutton et al., 2007; Lindsay et al., 2007). That is to say, implementation has
taken the FED-L path rather than the FED-H path. This is particularly worrying
given the relatively adverse consequences of FED-L in comparison with FED-H.
Although FED-L does have the advantage of decreasing the lag between innova-
tion and access, it may also have the unintended effects of lowering industry
investment in evidence development and shifting research costs to public fund
holders. Of greater concern is the potential for FED-L to (i) crowd-out interven-
tions funded through existing mechanisms in situations in which there is a ﬁxed
dedicated budget or (ii) lead to a de facto increase in the funding threshold and
increased expenditure growth in situations in which the programme budget is
open-ended.
The potential beneﬁts of FED should not, however, be understated. First, FED
has the potential to shorten the lag between innovation and access; increasing
(or, at very least, bringing forward) net beneﬁts derived from safe, effective
and cost-effective interventions. For many orphan drugs that offer limited
opportunities to recoup research and regulatory compliance costs and for many
non-drug interventions that have no natural commercial sponsor, traditional
funding pathways offer only weak incentives for private investment in evidence
development (Hughes et al., 2005; Tunis and Chalkidou, 2007: 433). For these
interventions, the lag between innovation and access may be substantial (or even
interminable). Second, FED data may have considerable value outside of its role
in updating listing decisions at the end of the FED period. Irrespective of the
inﬂuence of FED data in decisions to convert FED funding to permanent listing
at the end of the FED period, the evidence gathered under FED processes will
inform evidence-based practice and may prove decisive in the (delayed) provi-
sional or permanent listing decisions of other fund holders (Hutton et al., 2007).
Finally, it should be emphasized that much can be done to avoid the potentially
undesirable consequences of FED if policymakers are cognisant of the difﬁculties
that are likely to be faced when delisting provisionally funded interventions.
Careful consideration of the design and implementation of FED processes –
particularly with regard to delisting at the end of the FED period – can do much
to ensure that the addition of an FED pathway yields net beneﬁts rather than net
costs. In Australia, PBAC risk-sharing agreements have speciﬁed pricing schedules
that link departures from anticipated health gains to price reductions (Owen
et al., 2006; Wlodarczyk et al., 2006). Towse and Garrison note that this type of
agreement can be structured to ensure ‘‘that the technology remains cost effective
or to reimburse the payer for some or all of the costs of reversing a decision’’
(2010: 96). Although such agreements would ideally be structured to ensure that
price schedules are enforceable, even informal agreements may act to focus public
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opinion on the question of ‘value’ and ameliorate political resistance to delisting
(in the event that the sponsor opts to withdraw supply in the wake of scheduled
price reductions). In the United Kingdom, the NICE OIR provisions restrict
access to patients enrolled in clinical trials and this has the effect of restricting
numbers with a perceived entitlement to anticipated health gains. The use of
OIR-type provisions, perhaps modiﬁed along the lines suggested by Dhalla et al.
(2010), in preference to FED mechanisms with relatively unrestricted access
might therefore limit the political signiﬁcance of asymmetries in the value of
health gains/losses. Although it is likely that the design and implementation of
FED-type mechanisms will involve a complex trade-off between competing
objectives, it also seems clear that fund holders should prepare for the worst in
the knowledge that breaking up is often very hard to do.
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